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Social preferences have been shown to strongly affect individual behavior both in the laboratory, e.g., in dictator games, and in the field, e.g., for charitable giv-
ing.1 A large prior literature provides evidence of specific types of social preferences, 
such as pure or impure altruism and reciprocity, and links these preferences to sharing 
behavior (Fehr and Schmidt 2002). However, the existence, or even prevalence, of cer-
tain types of social preferences does not immediately imply that they are an important 
determinant of real-world sharing behavior. In order for sharing to occur frequently in 
economic contexts, individuals with pro-social types must be willing to place them-
selves in situations in which they have the opportunity to share.
In this paper, we argue that such sorting, whereby some individuals opt into envi-
ronments in which sharing is possible while others avoid these environments, has a 
strong effect on how much pro-social behavior is observed. Moreover, if individuals 
1 For reviews of the vast literature see, e.g., Camerer (2003) and Andreoni (2006).
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Sorting in Experiments with  
Application to Social Preferences†
By Edward P. Lazear, Ulrike Malmendier, and Roberto A. Weber*
Individuals sort into and out of economic environments based on 
their preferences and in response to relative prices. We demonstrate 
the importance of such sorting for the measurement of social prefer-
ences, using two laboratory experiments. First, allowing subjects to 
avoid environments in which sharing is possible significantly reduces 
sharing. This reveals the existence of a type of individual who shares 
reluctantly, preferring to avoid the opportunity to share. Second, 
after subsidizing the sharing environment, the aggregate amount 
shared increases, but less is shared, on average, by those who enter. 
Thus, subsidies intended to induce more sharing have weak effects 
since they attract those who share the least. (JEL C91, D12, D64)
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have the opportunity to opt into or out of real-world sharing environments, a labora-
tory experiment intended to assess the influence of social preferences should allow 
for that option. If not, the results of the experiment are less likely to be applicable to 
the real world. For example, some of the most popular fundraising methods (door-
to-door, donor lists, phone solicitation) involve being directly approached by the 
fundraiser, which makes it difficult to avoid the giving request. In response, the 
majority of American households use opt-out techniques such as do-not-call lists, 
leaving the fundraisers with a smaller and self-selected (possibly more generous) set 
of individuals to approach.2 Such sorting options are known to have strong effects 
on how much sharing ultimately takes place.
We use two laboratory experiments to show that sorting strongly affects which 
social-preference types are present in a given economic environment and, as a result, 
the observed sharing behavior. We use laboratory experiments because of the control 
they afford us in studying the effects of sorting on sharing, ceteris paribus, and because 
the majority of prior research on social preferences utilizes laboratory experiments, in 
particular dictator games. Our work compliments research exploring similar effects 
in the field, such as Della Vigna, List, and Malmendier (forthcoming) whose door-to-
door fundraising experiment “with sorting options” mirrors our laboratory design.3
Our design introduces a simple form of sorting into the dictator game: partici-
pants are allowed to “opt out” of playing the dictator game and, instead, to “enter” 
an experimental environment where they receive a fixed payment, while the poten-
tial recipient remains uninformed about the game. Our laboratory context therefore 
mimics situations in which a potential giver chooses whether to enter an environ-
ment in which sharing is possible, and the potential recipient becomes aware of the 
possible interaction only if entry occurs. We use this abstract experimental form of 
“sorting in dictator games” to model the more complex kind of sorting that moti-
vates our research: Individuals self-select into and out of environments in which 
they have the possibility of sharing their wealth with others. We also manipulate the 
price of entering the sharing environment by varying the endowment in the dictator 
game (w) relative to the outside option (w′ ).
In order to better understand the effects of sorting and entry prices on sharing, we 
distinguish three types of social preferences based on the observed sharing behavior. 
First, “willing sharers” share a positive amount, if asked to, and seek the opportunity 
to do so. Second, “reluctant sharers” share, if asked to, but prefer to avoid the sharing 
environment. Third, “nonsharers” simply never share. These three classes comprise a 
variety of social preferences discussed in the literature. For example, “willing sharers” 
might be motivated by pure or impure (warm-glow) altruism (Fehr and Gächter 2000; 
Andreoni 1989 and 1990), or by self-signaling (Bodner and Prelec 2002; Benabou and 
Tirole 2006; Grossman 2009). “Reluctant sharers” may share because they feel shame, 
guilt, or social pressure to conform to a request (Milgram 1963; Kandel and Lazear 
1992; Bernheim 1994; Tadelis 2008; Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007; Charness and 
2 According to the 2009 Economic Report of the President (Box 9-1), 72 percent of Americans were registered 
with National Do Not Call program as of 2007.
3 Similarly, Lacetera, Macis, and Slonim (2009) study the sorting implications of financial incentives for blood 
donations.
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Dufwenberg 2006; Dillenberger and Sadowski forthcoming). “Nonsharers” might 
have “classical” self-interested preferences, or they may feel social pressure to give 
but are able to resist the pressure. Our coarse distinction, based on observed behavior, 
suffices to generate predictions about differential sorting as the price for entry varies, 
and about the resulting sample composition.
In the first experiment, we introduce sorting into a dictator game. We give par-
ticipants a choice between an environment that allows sharing (a dictator game with 
endowment w) and one that does not (potential dictators are paid a fixed amount w′, 
and potential recipients are left unaware of the sharing possibility). We find that a 
costless sorting opportunity (w = w′ ) reduces the number of sharers by half. This 
implies that giving is utility-decreasing, relative to opting out of the sharing environ-
ment, for at least half of the individuals that would give a positive amount in stan-
dard dictator games. Surprisingly, also some of the most generous sharers sort out of 
the dictator game, suggesting that observed generosity is not a good measure of the 
experienced utility from giving. The sorting effect is robust across geographic loca-
tions and within demographic subsamples. In fact, sorting has considerably greater 
economical and statistical power to predict giving than any demographic character-
istic, including social background and past charitable giving.
In the second experiment, we introduce price effects. We test whether relative 
prices in settings with and without sharing affect the differential sorting of individu-
als with different social preferences. Specifically, we make the dictator game finan-
cially more attractive relative to the outside option (w > w′ ). As a result, all “willing 
sharers” and “nonsharers” should enter; but, among the “reluctant sharers,” only 
those should enter for whom the additional endowment w − w′  more than offsets 
the disutility from being pressured (or shamed) into giving. We find that the subsidy 
leads to greater entry into the sharing environment and a higher aggregate amount 
shared. However, it disproportionately attracts those who share the least—nonshar-
ers and the least generous reluctant sharers. As a result, the introduction of a small 
subsidy increases the total amount shared but lowers the average amount shared 
among entrants. Thus, subsidies intended to induce individuals to share may have 
weak effects since they attract those who share the least.4
The latter experiment also utilizes a within-subject design, in which we confront 
subjects with increasingly higher subsidies. This accomplishes two goals. First, we 
can show directly that those reluctant sharers who share the most in a standard dic-
tator game (without sorting) are least willing to re-enter the dictator game. Second, 
the within-subjects data allows us to classify social-preference types more precisely 
than the between-subjects data from the first experiment, since we need to observe 
individuals both in an environment with and in an environment without sorting 
opportunity to distinguish willing and reluctant sharers.
Our results show that the opportunity to avoid a sharing environment significantly 
affects the measured role of social preferences. A key insight is that, in generalizing 
4 In unreported results, we also find that the reverse holds. When increasing the cost of entry into the shar-
ing environment relative to the outside option (w < w′ ), few subjects enter, but those subjects share substan-
tially. Hence, sharing environments with a cost of entry attract primarily those who share the most. See Lazear, 
Malmendier, and Weber (2010).
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from experiments on social preferences to the world outside the laboratory, one 
needs to account for the effects of individuals sorting between environments that 
allow different kinds of social acts. In the field, individuals sort into and out of 
environments based on preferences and prices. Thus, individuals who participate in 
a market are unlikely to be a random sample of the population.5 A significant con-
tribution of our research is to demonstrate how the introduction of a simple kind of 
sorting behavior into a widely used laboratory paradigm can dramatically alter the 
observed results and conclusions, while also providing valuable information on how 
sorting is likely to impact behavior and outcomes in the field.6
In addition, allowing for sorting in experiments helps identify social preferences. 
In an environment where opting out is difficult, an individual may appear to be a 
“willing sharer” even though she actually prefers to avoid sharing. While our work 
does not attempt to pin down the exact preferences underlying “reluctant sharing,” it 
reveals that looking at behavior across environments with and without sorting helps 
to distinguish among different motives.7
I. Predictions: Sorting and Sharing under  
Heterogeneous Social Preferences
Consider an agent who sorts into one of two possible economic settings, one 
with a sharing opportunity and one without. In the sharing environment, the agent 
is endowed with an amount w and can divide w into a payoff for herself (x) and a 
payoff for another agent (y). In the environment without a sharing opportunity, the 
agent receives a possibly different amount w′, and the other agent receives nothing 
(y = 0). We allow the agent’s utility to depend on the payoffs x and y as well as 
on the environment D, u = u(D, x, y), where D equals 1 if the environment allows 
sharing and 0 otherwise.8 In this framework, a sorting option means that the agent 
can choose between the environment with and without a sharing opportunity. Note 
that an agent who chooses to be in an environment obtains the same utility as an 
5 Critics have questioned whether experimental results based on samples selected among college students apply 
to “real people” performing “real tasks” (cf. Harrison and List 2004). Many such criticisms have been success-
fully addressed, for example, by replicating experiments with higher stakes (Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 1996; 
Cameron 1999; Camerer and Hogarth 1999; Fehr, Fischbacher, and Tougareva 2002) or with professionals (see the 
overview in Harrison and List 2004, Section 4). The point of our paper is different. Rather than arguing that the 
samples are too narrow to reflect the overall population, we ask whether their selection is too broad to make infer-
ences about the field. In addition, we demonstrate the potential of experiments to analyze sorting directly.
6 Other studies have addressed the role of sorting in contexts such as prisoner’s dilemma and public goods 
games (Bohnet and Kübler 2005; Ahn, Isaac, and Salmon 2008), the choice of reward and punishment institu-
tions (Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach 2006; Haigner, Kocher, and Sutter 2006; Botelho et al. 2005), incen-
tive contracts (Eriksson and Villeval 2004; Dohmen and Falk 2006), auctions (Palfrey and Pevnitskaya 2008), 
risky choices (Harrison, Lau, and Rutström 2009), partner selection in trust and dictator games (Slonim and 
Garbarino 2008), and entry into competitive environments (Camerer and Lovallo 1999; Niederle and Vesterlund 
2007; Bartling et al. 2009).
7 Similarly to us, Dana, Cain, and Dawes (2006) (see also Broberg, Ellingsen, and Johannesson 2007) analyze 
sharing motives and willingness to pay to avoid the dictator game, but they do not focus on the effect of sorting or 
price variation. Other research, e.g., Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007) and Benabou and Tirole (2006), explores the 
motivation behind reluctant sharing.
8 By including only “own payoff ” and “others’ payoff” into the utility function, we implicitly assume narrow 
framing. That is, the agent does not consider payoffs or wealth beyond payoffs from the current decision.
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agent exogenously assigned to such an environment, holding payoffs constant.9 We 
define the proportion shared in the sharing environment to be a = y/(x + y).
We distinguish three types of social preferences, based on the observed sharing 
behavior and on the observed sorting between the environments with and without a 
sharing opportunity. First, some individuals share a positive amount if in the sharing 
environment, arg ma x x∈[0,w] u(1, x, w − x) < w, and they prefer to be in such an envi-
ronment when w = w′, i.e., ma x x∈[0,w] u(1, x, w − x) > u(0, w, 0). This type, which 
we term “willing sharer,” derives utility from sharing and sorts into (and shares 
in) a dictator game whenever the cost of entering the game is less than or equal to 
zero. These social preferences include a range of sharing motives, such as pure and 
impure altruism and inequity aversion (Andreoni 1990; Fehr and Schmidt 1999).
The second type shares a positive amount, arg ma x x∈[0,w] u(1, x, w − x) < w, 
but prefers not to have the option to share when there is no monetary reward, 
ma x x∈[0,w] u(1, x, w − x) < u(0, w, 0). We refer to this type as “reluctant sharer.” This 
type share, for example, due to social pressure to comply with a sharing norm, out 
of shame or guilt at not sharing, due to (narrow) inequity aversion that is not felt 
when opting out, or due to “emotional altruism,” i.e., not wanting to hurt the other 
person’s feelings by saying no to a sharing request. We do not distinguish between 
these interpretations. Our goal is simply to detect reluctance to share, using the sort-
ing option, and to assess its magnitude and responsiveness to prices. For reluctant 
sharers, we also investigate whether they not only prefer to opt out whenever the 
cost is zero (w = w′ ), but may even be willing to incur a positive cost (w > w′ ) to 
avoid sharing.
The third type does not share, even if the environment allows for sharing: 
arg ma x x∈[0, w] u(1, x, w − x) = w. We call this type “nonsharer.” Most straightfor-
ward, we can interpret nonsharers as stan dard economic agents who derive utility 
from their own payoff and are not affected by the presence of a sharing opportunity, 
ma x x∈[0,w] u(1, x, w − x) = u(1, w, 0) = u(0, w, 0). In that case, nonsharers are 
 indifferent between environments with and without sharing, and we have no pre-
diction about their sorting when w = w′.10 When the sharing environment yields a 
greater payoff (w > w′ ), however, we predict that they enter (and share zero).
Based on the above three kinds of social preferences, we can generate simple pre-
dictions about sharing and sorting behavior and its interaction with prices. The core 
proposition deals with the impact of reluctant sharers if sorting is possible at no cost.
PROPOSITION 1: The introduction of a sorting option in a sharing environment, 
with equal endowment in the environments with and without sharing (w = w′ ), 
reduces the aggregate amount shared.
9 Alternatively, agents may obtain lower utility when choosing to avoid the sharing opportunity than when being 
exogenously assigned to the nonsharing environment, e.g., disutility from (self-) signaling that they prefer not to 
face the request to share. If such effects exist, our experiments underestimate the extent of reluctant sharing.
10 Alternatively, nonsharers may derive disutility from social pressure or guilt, when in the sharing environment, 
like reluctant sharers, but are able to resist the pressure to share. Such “reluctant nonsharers” opt out even if the 
endowment is identical in both environments, u(1, w, 0) < u(0, w, 0). Neglecting this type of “reluctance” results in 
its underestimation and makes our estimates of the relevance of sorting more conservative.
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This follows from the fact that reluctant sharers opt out of the sharing environ-
ment when costless sorting is introduced (w = w′ ) and the assumption that the cost-
less sorting option does not affect the behavior of willing sharers or of nonsharers.
We next consider how subsidizing entry into the sharing environment (w > w′ ) 
influences sorting and sharing behavior. It is straightforward to show that entry 
into the sharing environment increases in the size of the subsidy w  –  w′: Willing 
sharers always enter, even when the subsidy is zero. Nonsharers enter at any 
positive subsidy. And reluctant sharers opt into the sharing environment when 
ma x x∈[0,w] u(1, x, w − x) > u(0, w′, 0). This latter condition is more likely to hold the 
larger w is, and hence the larger max u(1, ⋅ , ⋅ ) is. Therefore, we expect larger and larger 
subsidies to lure more and more reluctant sharers back into the sharing environment.
Our theoretical framework also illustrates that the decision to enter a sharing 
environment is not necessarily positively related to the portion a that agents share 
when they are in the sharing environment. Consider, for example, the case in which 
the relative decrease in endowment (w –w′ )/w (with w > w′ ) that a reluctant sharer 
accepts to avoid the sharing environment is an increasing function of the amount 
a she shares when put in the sharing environment, (w − w′ )/w = f (a) and f ′ > 0. 
This implies that, among reluctant sharers, those who share the most in the sharing 
environment are also those willing to pay the most to avoid the sharing environment. 
We refer to this condition as “relative sharing aversion.” The most generous reluc-
tant sharers are least willing to enter the environment where sharing is possible.11 As 
a result, reluctant sharers’ generosity, conditional on giving, is a negative predictor 
of their inclination to enter the sharing environment.
In our laboratory experiments, we will test the degree to which the presence 
of reluctant sharers and sorting opportunities affect the prevalence of sharing 
(Proposition 1). We also consider, in our second experiment, how subsidized entry 
into the sharing environment interacts with sharing preferences, i.e., how subsidies 
affect the composition of and behavior observed in the sharing environment.
II. Experiment 1: Costless Sorting
Experiment 1 uses a between-subjects design to compare outcomes in dictator 
games without and with sorting. We hold the endowment constant (w = w′ ).
A. Experimental Design
Experiment 1 was conducted in Barcelona, Spain, and Berkeley, CA with students 
of the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF), the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 
(UAB), and the University of California, Berkeley. We conducted 16 sessions, 8 in 
11 A modified Cobb-Douglas utility function, which allows for utility from sharing for reluctant sharers, also has 
this property (see Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber 2010). Relative sharing aversion also obtains under the simple 
assumption that the utility of reluctant sharers is determined solely by their own monetary payoff. Relative sharing 
aversion is, however, not a logical necessity. For example, a person might be close to indifferent between sharing 
or not, preferring to avoid sharing, but once in the sharing environment chooses to share a great deal. Another, who 
detests sharing, might part with only a few pennies in the sharing environment, but bears tremendous embarrass-
ment from doing so. The second might pay more to avoid the sharing environment than the first.
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each city, and each lasting 20 to 25 minutes, with an even number of 10 to 36 par-
ticipants. In total, 336 subjects participated (154 in Barcelona, 182 in Berkeley): 166 
subjects (83 dictators) in the treatment without sorting and 170 subjects (85 dictators) 
in the treatment with sorting.
Upon arrival, subjects were told that they would receive a participation fee (€5 in 
Barcelona12 and $5 in Berkeley) and that they might earn additional money. Subjects 
randomly drew participant numbers, which determined their role. One half of the sub-
jects, the recipients, were asked to complete a brief questionnaire, for which they 
would not receive any additional payment, and to then wait quietly. The other half, the 
dictators, were located in a separate room and received instructions both in writing and 
aloud.13 These instructions varied by treatment. In some sessions we conducted stan-
dard dictator games without sorting, and in the other sessions, we introduced sorting.
No-Sorting Treatment.—In dictator games without sorting, dictators were asked to 
divide €10 (Barcelona) or $10 (Berkeley) with a randomly and anonymously matched 
subject in the other room. At the end of the experiment, the experimenter would 
describe the game to the participants in the other room and show each of them how 
much money they received. Each dictator received an envelope with a sheet indicating 
the number of the paired recipient. Dictators wrote their own participant number on 
the sheet and indicated a division of the endowment in increments of 10 (Barcelona) 
or 25 (Berkeley) cents. The experimenter then collected the envelopes and asked the 
dictators to complete the same one-page questionnaire as the recipients.
Sorting Treatment.—In games with sorting, we added an initial stage in which each 
dictator decided whether to enter the dictator game. We use this choice between a 
second stage with sharing opportunity (dictator game) and one without sharing oppor-
tunity (fixed payment) as a simple, abstract way to represent the decision of whether 
to sort into an environment in which sharing is possible. Dictators received two enve-
lopes labeled “participate” and “don’t participate.” If they chose to participate in the 
dictator game, they were instructed to open the envelope marked “participate,” which 
contained the sheet with the participant number of the paired recipient. They would 
record their own number and specify a division. If they chose not to participate, they 
received $10 (€10) without the option to divide the money. In that case, they opened 
the envelope marked “don’t participate” (which did not contain a matched participant 
number) and wrote only their own participant number on the sheet inside.14 After col-
lecting the envelopes, the experimenter separated receivers matched with participating 
and nonparticipating dictators. For those matched with nonpar tic i pat ing dictators, the 
experiment ended and these subjects received only the $5 (€5) participation fee. Those 
paired with participating dictators received a description of the dictator game, and saw 
the sheet informing them of how much they had been given by an anonymous dictator.
12 At the time the sessions were conducted, €1 was worth about $1.28.
13 Instructions and materials for experiments at both locations are in the Appendix. Instructions for Experiment 2 
are similar, except for the specified treatment differences. The Barcelona sessions were conducted in Spanish 
(Castilian), but the instructions are translated into English.
14 The procedure ensured that subjects participating and not participating wrote roughly the same amount on the 
sheets, thus preserving anonymity.
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The questionnaire, administered in both treatments, asked for detailed demo-
graphics. We also asked about social preferences (donations to charity during the 
past year), risk preferences (like or dislike of risks), and how many people “in the 
other room” a subject knew. In Berkeley, we added the question “Why did you 
decide to share (or not share) the amount you did in the experimental task today? If 
applicable, why did you decide not to participate?”
B. results
Experiment 1 allows us to test whether sorting decreases the aggregate amount 
shared and to infer the relative frequencies of reluctant and willing sharers 
(Proposition 1). We can also draw inferences about the relative generosity of reluc-
tant and willing sharers.
Figures 1A and 1B show the distributions of amounts shared, and the frequen-
cies of subjects who opt out of the sharing environment, separately for Barcelona 
and Berkeley. Without sorting, sharing is comparable to previous experiments, 
€1.87 on average in Barcelona and $2.00 in Berkeley. Most subjects share a posi-
tive amount (60 percent in Barcelona, 64 percent in Berkeley). However, the intro-
duction of sorting strongly decreases the average amount shared to only €0.58 in 
Barcelona and $1.21 in Berkeley. Both decreases are statistically significant in a 
nonparametric rank-sum test (Barcelona: z = 3.39, p < 0.001; Berkeley: z = 2.34, 
p = 0.02). As predicted, and consistent with previous results, many subjects choose 
to opt out, 72 percent in Barcelona and 50 percent in Berkeley, with the difference 
between locations being statistically significant in a nonparametric chi-squared test 
(χ2(1) = 4.18, p = 0.04).
Our data allows estimating the relative frequencies of the three postulated social-
preference types. Nonsharers are those 35 percent who do not share even in the 
no-sorting treatment, i.e., the standard dictator game (33 percent in Barcelona, 36 
percent in Berkeley). Willing sharers are those 32 percent who share even in the sort-
ing treatment (28 percent in Barcelona, 38 percent in Berkeley). Reluctant sharers 
make up the remaining 33 percent (39 percent in Barcelona, 26 percent in Berkeley), 
implicitly sharing in the no-sorting treatment but not in the sorting treatment.
Table 1 confirms the statistical significance of our findings in a linear regres-
sion and in a tobit estimation for the percentage of the endowment shared, and in 
a probit estimation for the frequency of sharing.15 Standard errors are robust to 
15 The distributions of amounts given in Figures 1A and 1B suggest a tobit model to account for the $0 corner 
solution. Note that the use of a hurdle model (see Mullahy 1986) to account for the two-step decision—whether to 
participate and, if participating, how much to give—is not appropriate here. The hurdle model generalizes the tobit 
model in allowing two separate stochastic processes to determine participation and, conditional on participation, 
the amount given. However, unlike the data typically analyzed with hurdle models (including previous work related 
to dictator games, e.g., Erkal, Gangadharan, and Nikiforakis forthcoming), our data contains two distinct processes 
generating zero sharing: opting out and opting in but sharing zero. A standard hurdle model would treat all zeros 
as determined by a single binary process. This is, at best, unnecessary since we directly observe the two processes 
generating zero, and would need to be accounted for by extending the first stage to a bivariate probit. More likely, 
this approach is problematic since the focus of our experiments is to analyze specifically the effect of allowing for 
two different types of zeros on the composition of participants in the sharing environment.
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Figure 1B. Distributions of Amounts Shared 
(Experiment 1, Barcelona)
Figure 1C. Distribution of Difference in Amounts Shared 
(Experiment 1, Berkeley and Barcelona)
Notes: In Figure 1C, coefficient estimates of the sorting indicator and confidence intervals are from linear regressions 
of indicators for giving bins on the treatment dummy (sorting) and the full set of socio-demographic control variables 
(see Table 2). Confidence intervals use bias-corrected robust standard errors (HC3).
Figure 1A. Distributions of Amounts Shared 
(Experiment 1, Berkeley)
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heteroskedasticity and, in the linear regressions, adjusted for small-sample bias.16 
Under all estimation procedures, sorting significantly reduces sharing, and the effect 
is similar across cities (insignificantly larger in Barcelona).
In addition, the distributions of giving with and without sorting reveal that many 
of the givers affected by the sorting option are rather generous. To assess the distri-
butional effects, we estimate seven separate linear regressions with an indicator for 
each giving bin from Figures 1A and 1B as the independent variables, and an indica-
tor for sorting as the main explanatory variable. We pool the Berkeley and Barcelona 
data, neglecting currency differences, and include zero giving after opting out in the 
0.00 bin. To maximize efficiency, we control for the full set of socioeconomic sur-
vey variables and for the sites Berkeley, Pompeu Fabra, and Autonoma. (The result-
ing 11 individual characteristics are listed in Table 2.) The coefficient estimates of 
the Sorting indicator and the 95 percent confidence intervals (using bias-corrected 
robust standard errors (HC3)) are displayed in Figure 1C. Sorting significantly 
increases the percentage of subjects giving zero by 33.7 percent. The biggest and 
most significant negative shifts occur for giving between 3 and 4 (–10.0 percent, 
p-value = 0.021) and between 4 and 5 (–12.2 percent, p-value = 0.046).17 This 
16 Following Mac Kin non and White (1985), we use the residual-variance estimator HC3, which approximates a 
jackknife estimator. Similarly, in the tobit model, we perform a jackknife estimation, which produces slightly more 
conservative standard errors than the robust variance estimator. If we cluster by session, standard errors in this and 
in all other estimations are very similar and typically slightly smaller, though unlikely to be reliable given the few 
clusters (16 sessions in this table, fewer in other estimations).
17 The reduction in giving between 0 and 1 is also relatively large and marginally significant (− 9.3 percent, p-value 
= 0.083). The results are very similar under various alternative sample splits into different giving bins. For example, if 
we equalize bin size to 7-8 percent of subjects (other than the large, non-separable bin of subjects giving $0) and split 
into 0.00, (0.00-1.00), 1.00, (1.00-2.00], (2.00-3.50], (3.50-4.50], and more than 4.50, the largest significant reductions 
in sharing come from the bins of 1.00, (3.50-4.50], and more than 4.50. Quantile regressions confirm the same pat-
tern, though they cannot be estimated for the lower quantiles due to the mass point at zero of the dependent variable.
Table 1—Effect of Sorting on Sharing 
Model:
Dependent variable:
OLS
Proportion Shared
Tobit
Proportion Shared
Probit
Proportion Shared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sorting −0.102**
(0.029)
−0.079*
(0.043)
−0.234***
(0.0578)
−0.173**
(0.078)
−0.309***
(0.073)
−0.253**
(0.102)
Barcelona −0.013
(0.045)
−0.024
(0.074)
−0.041
(0.112)
Sorting × Barcelona −0.050
(0.058)
−0.145
(0.124)
−0.139
(0.154)
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168
(Pseudo-) r2 0.070 0.084 0.086 0.107 0.070 0.082
Notes: Sorting is a dummy equal to 1 in treatments where subjects can opt out. The dependent variable Proportion 
Shared is 0 for subjects who opted out. The dependent variable Shared Something is a dummy equal to one if the sub-
ject shared a positive amount. The tobit model accounts for 89 observations being left-censored at zero. The probit 
model estimates are marginal effects. Robust standards are in parentheses (with bias-correction (HC3) in the linear 
case, see MacKinnon and White 1985) and are calculated using jackknife estimation for the tobit model. Constant 
included.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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finding provides evidence that sorting matters even for the subset of relatively gen-
erous givers. A large fraction of those who share generously do so reluctantly. 
We gauge the importance and robustness of sorting by relating it to other deter-
minants of sharing. Table 2 compares the effect of sorting on the percentage shared 
(column 1) to the effect of the demographics and self-reported preferences on the 
percentage shared (column 2) in a simple linear framework, again with bias-cor-
rected robust standard errors. While the effect of sorting is highly significant and 
large (–10 percent), all other dummy coefficients are smaller in absolute size, and 
Table 2—Determinants of Sharing (Experiment 1)
Coefficients of partial
(1) (2) (3) determination
Sorting −0.102*** −0.104***
(0.029) (0.033) 0.28
Gender: Female −0.010 −0.013
(0.033) (0.032) 0.03
Ethnicity: Catalan 0.0285 0.042
(0.045) (0.044) 0.08
Ethnicity: Asian 0.016 0.001
(0.058) (0.057) 0.00
Ethnicity: White −0.075 −0.074
(0.057) (0.054) 0.10
Socio-economic Status: Middle Class −0.005 0.006
(0.039) (0.038) 0.01
Upper to Middle Class −0.006 −0.005
(0.043) (0.043) 0.01
Age Group: Graduate Student −0.010 −0.012
(0.053) (0.053) 0.02
Major: Business or Economics −0.040 −0.036
(0.037) (0.037) 0.09
University: Berkeley 0.011 0.021
(0.067) (0.063) 0.03
University: Pompeu Fabra −0.065 −0.073
(0.050) (0.049) 0.13
Siblings: 0 Siblings 0.054 0.037
(0.067) (0.071) 0.05
     1 Sibling −0.078** −0.083**
(0.037) (0.035) 0.19
     3 or more Siblings −0.047 −0.058
(0.057) (0.055) 0.10
Donation (during past year) −0.047 −0.033
(0.034) (0.032) 0.08
Risk-seeking 0.043 0.029
(0.034) (0.034) 0.08
Constant 0.194*** 0.214*** 0.264***
(0.022) (0.076) (0.070)
Observations 168 166 166
(Adjusted) r2 0.07 0.03 0.10
Notes: OLS regressions with Percentage Shared (out of $10.00 or €10.00 endowment) as the dependent
variable. Bias-corrected robust standard errors (HC3) are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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only one enters significantly. The results are very similar when including both the 
sorting dummy and the individual characteristics (column 3).18 Overall, sorting is 
significantly more important than any of the individual characteristics in determin-
ing sharing behavior.
A second measure of the importance of sorting is the portion of explained vari-
ance. In the regression with only Sorting as the independent variable (column 1), the 
adjusted r2 is 0.07. In the regression with the 11 individual characteristics (column 
2), it is only 0.03.19 That is, the observable characteristics explain only half as much 
variance as Sorting alone, once we account for the effect of merely adding pre-
dictors. More directly, we calculate the coefficients of partial determination in the 
regression including both Sorting and demographic dummies, shown to the right of 
the standard errors in column 3. The partial r2’s are calculated, for each predictor i, 
as (r2 – r (i) 2 )/(1 – r (i) 2 ), where  r (i) 2 is the r2 with predictor i removed from the equa-
tion. Each individual characteristic explains between 0.00 and 0.19 of the remaining 
unexplained variance, but Sorting explains 0.28. Thus, the Sorting variable not only 
has an economically and statistically larger effect, but also is a more reliable predic-
tor of sharing than any other variable.20
Overall, Experiment 1 provides evidence that not all sharing is the result of peo-
ple wanting to share. Instead, reluctant sharers and (some) nonsharers take advan-
tage of the costless sorting option.21 Surprisingly, the largest and most significant 
reductions in giving occur among relatively generous givers, who share $3–$5. This 
finding is a first indication that generosity in sharing does not necessarily imply high 
utility from sharing, which we explore in more detail in the next experiment.
III. Experiment 2: Subsidized Sharing
In Experiment 1, we explored the basic effect of sorting on aggregate sharing. We 
next introduce price effects to test whether relative prices in the environments with and 
without sorting affect the differential sorting of individuals with different social prefer-
ences. Specifically, we introduce subsidies (w > w′ ) for entry into the sharing environ-
ment and analyze how they influence the choice to (re-)enter the sharing environment.
The main focus is on the reluctant sharers. Since willing sharers enter (and share) 
whenever w ≥ w′, a subsidy should not change their entry decisions. Nonsharers are 
indifferent between not entering and entering (and sharing zero) when w = w′, but 
18 All findings are highly robust to alternative regression specifications, such as refinements of the dummies for 
age, social class, or major (though a higher number of controls risks saturating the model).
19 The adjusted r2 is calculated as 1 − (1 − r2) · [(N − 1)/(N − K − 1)], where N is the number of observa-
tions and K the number of predictors.
20 We also check the robustness of the sorting effect across different subgroups of subjects. For each demographic 
characteristic (subsamples by gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status, age, siblings), including educational choices 
(major, university), and for the elicited preferences (donations, risk preferences), we calculate the average amount 
shared in the treatment without sorting and the treatment with sorting. The results are displayed in Figure A1 in the 
Appendix. In all but one of the 20 subgroups, the average amount shared without sorting (left bars) is lower than the 
average amount shared with sorting (right bars). Thus, our baseline result is not only robust to the inclusion of indi-
vidual characteristics as controls, but also pervasive throughout all categorizations by such characteristics.
21 Among those who chose to enter the dictator game, 21 percent (7 of 34) gave nothing to the recipient. This 
represents 8 percent of the total population, including those who opted out. The existence of such behavior is con-
sistent with our interpretation of “nonsharers” as being indifferent between entering and not entering when w = w′.
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enter and share nothing whenever w > w′ . Reluctant sharers, instead, view entering 
and sharing as costly, and therefore their entry decision depends on the size of the 
subsidy. For example, if their disutility from entry is proportional to some positive 
function of the amount they share initially (relative sharing aversion), low subsidies 
will primarily attract those reluctant sharers who share the least. As a result, small 
subsidies may decrease the average amount shared by entrants.
In order to pin down subjects’ types and generosity in sharing, we use a within-
subject design. Each subject first plays the standard dictator game for $10 both 
without and with a sorting option, but no price differential (w = w′ ). The behav-
ior observed in the two games determines each individual’s type. This part of the 
experiment is a within-subject replication of the two treatments in Experiment 1. 
Then, subjects play the sorting treatment with increasing subsidies for entry into the 
dictator game (w > w′ ). The amount available in the dictator game goes up while 
the amount available after opting out remains $10. The observed response to the 
increasing subsidies reveals how the sorting behavior of the different types interacts 
with prices.
The within-subject design also provides a measure of the generosity of different 
types. The between-subject treatments of Experiment 1 made it difficult to assess 
whether those who share willingly are more generous than those who share reluc-
tantly since we could not track individuals across environments with and without 
sorting. Experiment 2 allows us to examine the amounts shared by all types in both 
the rounds without and the rounds with sorting.
Finally, we also add a no-anonymity treatment, which allows us to explore the 
robustness of our findings to situations in which dictators are not anonymous but 
have to face the recipient—as in the many cases in which real-world dictators are 
directly confronted by someone requesting aid or donations.
A. Experimental Design
Experiment 2 took place at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economic Laboratory 
(PEEL). Subjects were graduate and undergraduate students at the University of 
Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University. We conducted 12 sessions, 6 in each 
anonymity treatment. A total of 188 subjects participated: 92 (46 dictators) in the 
no-anonymity treatment and 96 (48 dictators) in the anonymity treatment.22
As in Experiment 1, sessions began with subjects being randomly separated 
into two groups. One half of the participants (recipients) went to a separate room 
where they completed questionnaires for approximately 20 minutes. The other 
half of the participants (dictators) were informed that they would make a series of 
decisions, with new instructions distributed prior to each decision. Payoffs would 
be based on one decision randomly selected at the end of the experiment. In each 
decision, the procedure replicated that of Experiment 1, other than changing the 
dictator game endowment.
22 One subject was accidentally allowed to participate twice (both times as dictator). We omitted this subject’s 
second participation from the data. Since subjects’ choices were never revealed to anyone else until the end of the 
experiment, it is very unlikely that this subject influenced the choices of other dictators in the second session.
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Decision 1.—Decision 1 consisted of a dictator game with no sorting. The endow-
ment was $10, denoted as 40 tokens. Subjects were told that if Decision 1 were 
selected to count at the end of the experiment, then the experimenter would describe 
the dictator game publicly to the other participants, and each recipient would find 
out how much money he or she had been given. In the no-anonymity treatment, the 
dictators themselves handed the sheets to the recipients.
Decision 2.—In Decision 2, dictators had the opportunity to play the same dicta-
tor game as in Decision 1, with a (potentially) new randomly selected participant. 
Alternatively, they could choose to “pass” (i.e., not to play the game). The procedure 
mirrored the sorting treatment in Experiment 1. Dictators had to open one of two 
envelopes. If they opened the envelope labeled “play,” they would see the number of 
their matched participant, write down their own number, and indicate a division of 
40 tokens. If they opened the envelope labeled “pass,” they would not see a partici-
pant number, but would write down their own number and mark an “X” on the sheet 
inside. Subjects were told that if they chose to play the game and if Decision 2 were 
selected to count, then their paired recipient would be informed about the game and 
the allocation of tokens.
remaining Decisions.—The remaining three decisions (four in the no-anonymity 
case) proceeded exactly as Decision 2, with the exception that the dictator-game 
endowment increased. Table 3 presents the endowment for each decision.23
At the end of each session, the experimenter randomly drew one of the decisions 
to count. Then either all recipients (if Decision 1 was drawn), or only those matched 
to dictators who decided to play (if Decision 2 or higher was drawn), returned to the 
main room and were informed about the game and shown the payoff sheet filled out 
by their matched dictator. In the no-anonymity treatment, the dictators themselves 
handed the sheets to the recipients. Participants were then paid their earnings and $6 
participation fee. Unmatched recipients were not informed about the game and were 
paid $6 after completing their questionnaires.
Note that we did not counterbalance the order of the decisions across sessions. 
The purpose of the within-subject design was to compare the rates of re-entry, under 
increasing subsidies, within the group of reluctant sharers. In order to be compa-
rable, all subjects had to be exposed to the exact same initial treatment. Among 
different possible “initial treatments,” the above order (starting with the standard 
dictator game) permits comparisons of the first decision to standard dictator games. 
However, other “initial treatments” might also be of interest, and the design and 
results leave open the question whether our classification of social-preference types 
and their differential sharing behaviors survive different ordering.24
23 The number of decisions and endowments differ between anonymity and no-anonymity treatments since an 
initial pilot session revealed that, under anonymity, almost all subjects play the dictator game once the endowment 
reaches about $13. Since our goal was to explain differences in “re-entry” to the game, we fine-tuned the payoffs 
to measure such differences. We also decreased the number of rounds to allow the experiment to run more quickly.
24 Note, however, that variation in the order of Decisions 1 and 2 turned out to be redundant since the outcomes 
closely replicate the results from the between-subjects experiment. Also note that we do not account, separately, for 
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B. results
The behavior in Decisions 1 and 2 strongly corroborates the findings of the 
between-subjects design in Experiment 1. When dictators are forced to play the 
game (Decision 1), 74 percent share. When subjects are given the opportunity to opt 
out of the game (Decision 2), only 30 percent share. As a result, the average amount 
shared per subject decreases substantially, from $2.68 without sorting (Decision 1) 
to $1.19 when sorting becomes possible (Decision 2).
The impact of sorting is robust to the removal of anonymity. In the standard 
dictator game (Decision 1), 81 percent share in the no-anonymity treatment and 
67 percent in the anonymity treatment. As shown in Table 3, subjects share aver-
age amounts of $2.42 (anonymity) and $2.92 (no-anonymity). Thus, the lack of 
anonymity produces slightly more sharing, but this difference is not statistically sig-
nificant (t92 = 1.17). In the dictator game with sorting (Decision 2), only 25 percent 
share in the no-anonymity treatment, and 35 percent share in the anonymity treat-
ment. The average amounts shared decrease, to $1.22 in anonymity and to $1.17 in 
no-anonymity. Thus, the lack of anonymity makes opting out even more attractive 
and reduces sharing slightly more, but the difference in amounts is again not signifi-
cant (t92 = 0.14).25
The results of the first two decisions in Experiment 2 demonstrate the robustness 
of the sorting effect from Experiment 1, both when we relax anonymity and when 
we conduct a within-subject test.
classification of Social-preference Types.—The within-subject design of 
Experiment 2 allows a classification of individual subjects into the three posited types. 
Based on their first two decisions, 23 percent of the subjects are nonsharers—they 
share nothing in Decision 1 and either opt not to play or share nothing in Decision 2. A 
slightly larger group, 29 percent, are willing sharers, who share both in Decision 1 and 
in Decision 2. The largest group, 41 percent, consists of reluctant sharers. They share 
in Decision 1 and opt out in Decision 2. These three categories account for 95 percent 
of the subjects.26 Compared to Experiment 1, the proportions differ slightly. Here, we 
learning since several recent studies of repeated dictator games have found little change in behavior over time (Duffy 
and Kornienko 2005; Hamman, Loewenstein, and Weber 2009), differently from, for example, the case of dominance-
solvable games (Rick and Weber 2010). We also analyzed an alternate dataset (Broberg, Ellingsen, and Johannesson 
2007), in which subjects first played a dictator game (Decision 1) and then stated a reservation price for exiting the 
game. Unlike in our data, where we directly observe re-entry into the sharing environment, re-entry in this other 
experiment is implicit in the reservation price. We confirm our finding that the amount shared is a negative predictor 
of reluctant individuals’ willingness to re-enter. Since the alternate experimental data was collected using different 
procedures (but never previously analyzed in light of our prediction), the confirmation of our results highlights that 
the strong compositional effects of sorting and prices are not unique to our experimental procedures. For detail on this 
reanalysis, see Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber (2010, appendix 2).
25 Behavior in Decisions 3 and higher does not differ between anonymity treatments either when control-
ling for endowments. For example, comparing Decision 3 under no-anonymity and Decision 4 under anonymity, 
both with an endowment of $11, we find that neither the average amounts shared ($1.51 and $1.42) are significantly 
different (t92 = 0.20) nor the frequencies of entry (z = 1.59).
26 Of the remaining five subjects, three shared something in Decision 1 ($0.25, $2.50, $5) and shared nothing in 
the remainder of the experiment (but frequently opted to play). We might classify these three subjects as reluctant 
sharers, though they did not rely on the sorting opportunity. Another subject shared $2.50 initially, shared $0.50 in 
Decision 4, and nothing otherwise (but opted to play every time). A final subject shared nothing initially, but then 
shared $4 in all subsequent decisions—possibly a willing sharer, with noise in the first decision.
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have fewer nonsharers and more reluctant sharers. The distributions of types do not 
differ significantly by anonymity (χ2(2) = 3.49, p = 0.18).27
Given the above classification, we can determine which type—willing sharers 
or reluctant sharers—behaves most generously in the dictator game. Recall that the 
average amount shared conditional on entry in Experiment 1 was slightly higher 
under sorting, but the between-subject design did not allow calculation of the 
unconditional sharing of both types. Experiment 2 reveals that the average amount 
shared (in Decision 1 without sorting) is $4.46 for willing sharers ($4.22 under 
anonymity and $4.77 under no-anonymity) and $3.10 for reluctant sharers ($3.20 
under anonymity and $3.04 under no-anonymity). The difference is significant at the 
p < 0.001 level (t64 = 3.95). Thus, those who share willingly, i.e., even when they 
can avoid the sharing environment, are, on average, significantly more generous 
27 Males are more likely to be nonsharers than women (M: 30 percent; F: 20 percent) and less likely to be 
reluctant sharers (M: 30 percent; F: 47 percent). However, the difference in distributions of types by gender is not 
statistically significant (χ2(2) = 1.97, p = 0.37).
Table 3—Average Amounts Shared under Subsidized Sharing (Experiment 2)
Sorting
option
($10)
Endowment
in dictator
game
Anonymity No anonymity
Decision
Average 
amount
(percent)
shared
Percent 
entering Decision
Average 
amount
(percent)
shared
Percent 
entering
No $10.00
(40 tokens) 1 $2.42(24.2%)
100% 1 $2.92
(29.2%)
100%
Yes $10.00
(40 tokens) 2 $1.22(12.2%)
46% 2 $1.17
(11.7%)
38%
Yes $10.50
(42 tokens) 3 $1.34(12.8%)
57%
Yes $11.00
(44 tokens) 4 $1.42(12.9%)
74% 3 $1.51
(13.7%)
58%
Yes $12.00
(48 tokens) 5 $1.52(12.7%)
76%
Yes $13.00
(52 tokens) 4 $2.07(15.9%)
73%
Yes $16.00
(64 tokens) 5 $3.21(20%)
90%
Yes $20.00
(80 tokens) 6 $4.53(22.7%)
100%
Number of sessions 6 6
Number of subjects
 (dictators)
92
(46)
96
(48)
Note: All averages are unconditional, i.e., subjects who opted out are included (as sharing $0).
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than those who share reluctantly, a finding confirmed in the door-to-door fundrais-
ing field experiment in DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (forthcoming).
compositional Effect: Who Do Subsidies Attract into the Sharing Environment?—
The principal issue addressed by Experiment 2 is how subsidizing entry into the 
sharing environment influences the sorting of different types. Willing sharers, by 
definition, enter the sharing environment when there is no subsidy (w = w′ ) and 
should continue to enter if there is a subsidy (w > w′ ). In fact, we find that, in 
Decisions 3 and up, when the sharing environment is subsidized, willing sharers 
enter the sharing environment 90 percent of the time.28 Upon entering, they share 
significant amounts, at least $3.82 on average for every endowment level.
Nonsharers, by definition, share nothing in Decision 2 when w = w′, mostly by opt-
ing out (70 percent). We predicted that those nonsharers who opt out re-enter when the 
sharing environment is subsidized. In Decisions 3 and beyond, nonsharers enter the 
sharing environment 78 percent of the time.29 As expected, they share very little when 
they enter, never more than $0.17, on average, for any dictator game endowment.
Most important is the behavior of reluctant sharers. Table 4 reports the marginal 
effects from probit estimations with subjects’ decisions to play (1) or to pass (0) as 
the dependent variable. Since all subjects had to play the game in Decision 1 and 
since the choice to pass in Decision 2 is used to construct the types, we exclude these 
two decisions from the analysis. We control for the endowment in each round.30
Column 1 explores the relative entry frequencies of the three different types. We 
exclude the five subjects who did not fit the classification scheme. The omitted cat-
egory, willing sharers, enters at a significantly higher rate than nonsharers (15 per-
cent more often) and than reluctant sharers (35 percent more often). The difference 
between nonsharers and reluctant sharers is statistically significant (χ2(1) = 13.89, 
p < 0.001). As predicted, reluctant sharers are the least willing to re-enter the shar-
ing environment as entry becomes subsidized.
Most interestingly, we also conjectured that those most likely to enter would be 
those reluctant sharers who share the least initially. Figures 2A and 2B show the fre-
quencies with which different subgroups of reluctant sharers re-enter the sharing envi-
ronment as the subsidy increases across decisions. We split reluctant sharers into three 
groups, based on how much they shared in Decision 1. Consistent with our prediction, 
those who re-enter first are those who shared the least in Decision 1. For example, those 
who shared only $1.25 or less in Decision 1 all re-enter the game by Decision 4 in both 
treatments, while those who shared more require greater subsidies to re-enter. In fact, 
for every decision, across both treatments, the highest entry frequency is for those who 
shared the least initially. Thus, for the subgroup of reluctant sharers, generosity in shar-
ing turns out to be a negative predictor of entry into the sharing environment.
28 As the percentage is below 100, our classification is imperfect. Two participants account for most of the 
exceptions. They shared positive amounts in Decisions 1 and 2 (and were thus classified as willing sharers), but 
opted out in every remaining Decision.
29 Entry among nonsharers increased with the size of the endowment in the game. For example, 61 percent 
entered in Decision 3, but more than 83 percent did so for all subsequent decisions. This reluctance to enter at low 
subsidies perhaps indicates that, as we discussed above, some nonsharers experience disutility from sharing nothing 
in the game—not enough to lead them to share, but enough to induce opting out and even foregoing a (low) subsidy.
30 The results in the table are substantively unchanged when we also control for treatment, gender, and decision.
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Columns 2–5 of Table 4 test the statistical significance of the relationship between 
entry and (initial) generosity in sharing. Column 2 shows that, taking willing and 
reluctant sharers together, there is no relation between initial proportion shared and 
entry. Column 3, however, reveals both that reluctant sharers enter at lower fre-
quency and that there is a significantly negative relationship between entry and ini-
tial proportion shared among reluctant sharers. This negative relationship appears to 
be driven by reluctant sharers who shared a lot initially (column 4): The interaction 
of initial proportion shared and classification as a reluctant sharer is significant, 
while the level effect of the initial proportion shared reverts back to being insig-
nificantly positive. Column 5 shows this more directly. If we restrict the sample to 
reluctant sharers, we find a strong negative relationship between the amount shared 
initially and entry into the sharing environment. The coefficient of Initial proportion 
shared indicates that for every additional percentage unit of the endowment shared 
in Decision 1, reluctant sharers are 0.82 percent less likely to enter the sharing envi-
ronment. Thus, a reluctant sharer who initially shared $5 is roughly 33 percent (i.e., 
0.82 ∙ 40 percentage units) less likely to enter than one who shared $1.
Overall, we find strong support for our conjecture that generosity in sharing is 
not a good predictor of utility from sharing. Subsidized entry by reluctant sharers 
is inversely proportional to the amount they share if the sharing environment is 
unavoidable (relative sharing aversion).
How Large Are The compositional Effects?—We have found that a subsidized 
sharing environment attracts foremost those subjects who are least willing to 
share—nonsharers and the least generous reluctant sharers. The economic mag-
nitude of the differential sorting effect is large. For example, in Decision 2, when 
Table 4—Determinants of Entry into Sharing Environment 
(Experiment 2, excluding decisions 1 and 2)
Sample:
All classified 
subject Willing and reluctant sharers 
Reluctant
sharers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial proportion shared 0.003
(0.175) −0.502***(0.182)
0.282
(0.417) −0.823***(0.265)
Nonsharers −0.154**
(0.077)
Reluctant sharers −0.346***
(0.060)
−0.350***
(0.052)
−0.025
(0.196)
Initial prop. shared ×  
 reluctant sharers
−0.882*
(0.460)
Endowment in dictator  
 game
0.068***
(0.009)
0.059***
(0.010)
0.067***
(0.010)
0.066***
(0.010)
0.086***
(0.014)
Observations 312 234 234 234 141
Pseudo-r2 0.228 0.113 0.270 0.279 0.223
Notes: The table reports marginal effects of probit estimations. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one 
if the subject shared any positive amount. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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sorting is costless, the average amount shared by those who enter the sharing envi-
ronment is $2.88 ($2.68 with anonymity and $3.11 without), a small increase rela-
tive to the $2.68 ($2.42 with anonymity and $2.92 without) in Decision 1, when 
everyone was required to enter, and similar to what we observed for Experiment 
1. But when there is a $1 subsidy for entering (Decision 4 with anonymity and 
Decision 3 without), the average amount shared by those who enter decreases to 
Figure 2A. Proportion of Reluctant Sharers Choosing to Enter 
by Decision and Initial Amount Shared (Anonymity)
Figure 2B. Proportion of Reluctant Sharers Choosing to Enter 
by Decision and Initial Amount Shared (No anonymity)
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$2.22 ($1.92 with anonymity and $2.59 without). In fact, for every subsidy level 
below $6, the average amount shared conditional on entry is lower than when 
there is no subsidy.
A possible concern about this large raw effect of sorting is that it may reflect influ-
ences other than the differential  sorting of different social-preference types. For exam-
ple, our design decision to use an increasing endowment or general round effects may 
affect our results. In order to distinguish these and other unspecified confounds from 
the compositional effect of differential sorting, we estimate the effect of mere sort-
ing under two “hypothetical sharing rules” that impose some consistency on shar-
ing behavior. One hypothetical sharing rule is that individuals always share the same 
proportion of the endowment as they did in Decision 1, if they decide to enter. This 
assumption amounts to individuals proportionally sharing the subsidy. An alternative 
hypothetical sharing rule is that individuals always share the same absolute amount 
as in Decision 1, conditional on entry. This assumption amounts to individuals fully 
pocketing the subsidy. These two hypothetical sharing rules provide bounds that accu-
rately describe 74 percent of the actual choices made by those entering the sharing 
environment in our experiment.
Table 5 estimates the magnitude of the compositional sorting effect under these 
two hypothetical sharing rules. For comparison, we show the estimations using the 
actual amount shared as the dependent variable in columns 1 (OLS) and 2 (tobit). 
We then show the estimations using the predicted amount if individuals shared 
the same proportion of the endowment as in Decision 1 (columns 3 and 4) or the 
same absolute amount as in Decision 1 (columns 5 and 6). (We use amounts rather 
than proportions as dependent variables to more clearly illustrate the monetary 
consequences of selective sorting.) We regress each of these dependent variables 
on three explanatory variables: “Sorting Option,” a binary variable equal to one in 
all rounds with a sorting option (Decisions 2–6); “Presence of Subsidy,” a binary 
variable equal to one in all rounds with subsidies (Decisions 3–6); and “Amount of 
Subsidy” ($0.50 to $10.00, see Table 5). Standard errors are clustered by subject.
The coefficient estimate of Sorting Option under the two hypothetical sharing 
rules measures the difference in sharing between willing and reluctant sharers. 
The positive coefficient indicates that those who enter the sharing environment in 
Decision 2 (willing sharers) share more, on average, than those who opt out when it 
is costless to do so (reluctant sharers).31
The coefficient for Presence of Subsidy is significantly negative and similar in 
magnitude under all three sharing rules, both in the OLS estimations and in the tobit 
estimations. The OLS estimates indicate that the presence of a subsidy decreases 
conditional amounts shared by about $0.90, controlling for the amount of the sub-
sidy. However, the coefficients for Amount of Subsidy reveal that each dollar of 
subsidy increases sharing amounts, by between $0.05 and $0.35 for the Predicted 
amount shared. Hence, a small subsidy (e.g., $1 or $2) results in lower average 
31 The fact that the coefficient is smaller in magnitude and in statistical significance for the actual amount than 
for the two hypothetical amounts indicates that willing sharers decreased the amount they shared between Decisions 
1 and 2. This could reflect, among other possibilities, a weakened motivation to share when one knows that one 
could have avoided the sharing environment altogether.
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amounts shared in the dictator game in all models. While the net negative effect in 
the first model (actual amount shared) could be influenced by people changing how 
much they share conditional on entry, Models 2 and 3 show that sorting alone has 
the same effect.
To summarize, we find that, as in Experiment 1, the presence of a sorting oppor-
tunity significantly decreases sharing. We also find that who sorts into and out of 
the sharing environment is determined by the interaction of prices and social prefer-
ences. Subsidizing entry into the sharing environment primarily attracts those who 
share the least. As a result the net effect of subsidies is decreased sharing, on aver-
age, conditional on entry.
In research not reported here (see Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber 2010), we 
also consider what happens when one makes entry into the sharing environment 
costly, relative to the environment in which sharing is not possible (w < w′ ). Here, 
we observed very little entry into the sharing environment (22 percent of subjects 
enter), i.e., only a subset of willing sharers pay to have the opportunity to share. 
However, among those who do sort into the sharing environment, the mean amount 
shared is quite high ($3.50). Therefore, while Experiment 2 shows that subsidized 
entry into the sharing environment attracts primarily those who share the least, this 
other study finds that costly entry into the sharing environment results in entry by 
those who tend to be the most generous.32
32 We also find both of these patterns—that subsidized entry primarily attracts those who share the least and 
that costly entry primarily attracts those who share the most—in a novel re-analysis of Broberg, Ellingsen, and 
Johannesson (2007) data. For details, see Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber (2010).
Table 5—Effects of Sorting and Subsidies on Conditional Sharing:  
Actual and Hypothetical Sharing Rules (Experiment 2)
Dependent variable:
Actual
amount shared
Predicted amount shared
(fixed proportion)
Predicted amount shared
(fixed amount)
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sorting Option
 (Decisions 2–6)
0.200
(0.293)
0.153
(0.450)
0.674***
(0.253)
0.815**
(0.350)
0.674***
(0.253)
0.779**
(0.320)
Presence of Subsidy
 (Decisions 3–6) −0.941***(0.263)
−1.134***
(0.374)
−0.955***
(0.270)
−1.214***
(0.377)
−0.894***
(0.253)
−1.096***
(0.329)
Amount of Subsidy 0.260***
(0.065)
0.288***
(0.082)
0.350***
(0.065)
0.391***
(0.078)
0.052
(0.041)
0.075
(0.054)
Constant 2.678***
(0.214)
2.122***
(0.341)
2.678***
(0.214)
2.156***
(0.351)
2.678***
(0.214)
2.305***
(0.313)
Observations 382 382 382 382 382 382
(pseudo) r2 0.072 0.011 0.143 0.024 0.015 0.003
Notes: Robust standard (errors clustered by subject) are in parentheses. The tobit model accounts for 114 observa-
tions being left-censored at 0 in column 2, and 96 observations in columns 4 and 6.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level
VoL. 4 No. 1 157LAzEAr ET AL.: SorTINg IN ExpErImENTS
IV. Discussion and Conclusion
People regularly sort into and out of economic environments. Their decision 
to enter into a particular environment is based on relative prices and governed by 
individual preferences. As a consequence of this endogenous selection, real-world 
outcomes can look very different from those based on experiments that capture the 
behavior of the typical individual in the (subject) population, rather than that of the 
typical individual who sorts into a particular economic environment.
Although a large literature in economics analyzes endogenous selection theo-
retically and empirically, there has been less emphasis on its role in the context of 
social preferences. Much of the literature on social preferences builds on laboratory 
findings that demonstrate the prevalence and significance of social preferences. But 
in the typical laboratory experiment, subjects are unaware of what the experiment is 
about at the time they are recruited. They are placed in one particular situation and 
have to make choices that they might avoid making outside the laboratory. Thus, 
opting into and out of these choice environments does not typically occur in the 
laboratory in the way that it does in the field.
The goal of our analysis is to model the influence of sorting in the context of social 
preferences. We introduce sorting into the dictator game, which is a common labo-
ratory framework for measuring sharing and social preferences. We allow subjects 
to select between an environment with a sharing opportunity—the standard dictator 
game—and an environment in which sharing is not possible—the potential dictator 
receives money without being asked to share, and the recipient is unaware of any 
potential sharing. This reflects the kinds of sorting opportunities that economic agents 
encounter in the real world, where the opportunity to share can often be avoided.
Our first key finding is that most individuals who share when they cannot avoid 
the sharing situation would prefer to opt out and not to share. This implies the pres-
ence of “reluctant sharers,” which account for 33 to 41 percent of all subjects in our 
experiments. This contrasts with 29 to 32 percent that we classify as “willing shar-
ers,” who share both when they do and do not have the opportunity to sort out of the 
sharing environment.
Our second key finding is that prices affect different types of social preferences 
differently and, hence, alter the composition of the sharing environment. Subsidizing 
entry into the sharing environment attracts people who share little, relative to when 
there is no subsidy, thereby leading to lower (conditional) average amounts shared 
in the sharing environment. Thus, sorting not only affects how many individuals 
share, but who chooses to do so.
Our work provides an example of how the laboratory can be used to systematically 
study the responsiveness of different types to varying sorting options. The results 
also have immediate implications for a variety of real-world sharing situations, in 
which individuals can decide whether or not to place themselves in environments 
where sharing is possible. Such contexts include charitable giving, blood donation, 
disaster relief, and responses to survey requests. Our findings illustrate that giving 
behavior can vary vastly depending on sorting opportunities, e.g., in a door-to-door 
fundraiser versus canvassing on the street, since the population reached is likely to 
feature different social preferences.
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Appendix: Sample Instructions for Experiment 1  
(Between-Subjects Design)
The text in brackets and in italics appears only in treatments with a sorting 
option.
General Instructions
Thank you for attending the experiment. The purpose of this session is to study 
how people make decisions. During the session, you are not permitted to talk or 
communicate with the other participants. If you have a question, please raise your 
hand and I will come to answer it.
During the session you will earn money. Everyone will receive €5 for their 
participation, which will be the minimum compensation for everyone. In addition, 
there exists a possibility that some may earn more money. At the end of the ses-
sion the quantity that you have earned will be paid to you in cash. The payments 
are confidential; we will not inform any of the other participants of the quantity 
that you earn.
In a moment, you will receive an envelope. Once everyone has received an enve-
lope, you may open it and you will see a card with a number. This is your identifica-
tion number for the experiment. After looking at it, please keep this number since it 
will be used during the experiment. This number is private and should not be shared 
with anybody else.
In a moment, I will ask that all of the participants with even numbers, mean-
ing 2, 4, 6, 8, etc., follow me outside this room. These participants will go to an 
adjacent area, where they will complete a brief questionnaire, and will receive the 
€5 payment from the experimenter for their participation. When leaving the room, 
please take all of your belongings.
Instructions for participants with odd numbers
In this experiment, each of you will [decide whether to participate or not] par-
ticipate in an activity. [That is, participating in the activity is optional.] The activity 
is the following:
The activity: You will be paired with one of the participants who just left 
this room. That is, each of you will be paired with one of the participants 
with an even number (2, 4, 6, … ). The pairings will be made randomly 
and anonymously, which means that nobody will know the identity of the 
person with whom he or she is paired. You will have to decide how to 
distribute €10 between yourself and the person with whom you are paired. 
That is, you will decide how much money, between €0.00 and €10.00, to 
give to the other person and how much to keep for yourself. For exam-
ple, you may decide to give €9.00 to the other person and keep €1.00 
for yourself, or you may instead decide to give €1.00 to the other per-
son and keep €9.00 for yourself. You may select any distribution of the 
€10 between yourself and the other person, in increments of €0.10. The 
assigned amounts will be paid to you and to the other person (in addition 
to the €5 for participation).
Are there questions about the activity?
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The participants in the adjacent area do not know anything about this activity. 
They received a questionnaire and were asked to complete it.
[you must decide whether to participate or not participate in the activity.
 • If you opt to participate in the activity, you will be paired with one of the 
other participants and will distribute the €10 between yourself and this par-
ticipant.] At the conclusion of the session the participant with whom you are 
paired will re-enter this room and I will explain the activity to him or her. 
This participant will then discover how much money he or she received from 
you and how much you kept for yourself. You and the other participant will 
receive these quantities, plus the €5 for participation.
 • [If you opt not to participate in the activity you will not be paired with any 
other participant and you will not distribute any money. In this case you will 
receive a fixed amount of €10 (plus the €5 for participation), but you will 
not have the option to distribute this money. At the conclusion of the session, 
I will go to the adjacent area and I will pay €5 to the people who are not 
paired with anyone in this room. These people will not receive any informa-
tion about the activity.]
This session will now proceed as follows:
 1) Each of you has an envelope [ … two envelopes: one labeled “participate” 
and another “don’t participate”]. Please do not open this envelope [either 
envelope] yet.
 2) [If you decide to not participate in the activity, you will open the envelope 
labeled “don’t participate.” Inside this envelope is a sheet. once you open 
the envelope, you will remove the sheet and write your participant number in 
the indicated space. you will receive €10.
 3) If you decide to participate in the activity, you will open the envelope labeled 
“participate.”] Inside the envelope is a sheet with the number of the par-
ticipant with whom you are paired and on which you will indicate how to 
distribute the €10 between the other person and yourself. Once you open the 
envelope, you will remove the sheet and will write your participant number 
in the indicated space. In addition you should look over the sheet to see the 
number of the participant with whom you are paired. You should then indi-
cate how you wish to distribute the €10 between the other participant and 
yourself. The total of the two quantities should sum to exactly 10.00. If they 
do not sum to 10.00, then the other participant will receive the amount that 
you specify and you will receive the remainder.
 4) [In either case,] Once you finish, place the sheet back in the envelope and I 
will collect the envelopes.
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At the end of the session, we will do the following:
 5) The experimenter will go to the adjacent area and will bring the other partic-
ipants. [ … only those participants who are paired with someone who opted 
to participate in the activity. The rest of the participants in the adjacent area 
will not be paired, will receive the €5 for their participation and for them the 
experiment will have concluded.
 6) If you opted to participate in the activity, the participant with whom you are 
paired will reenter this room and will … ] These participants will receive a 
brief explanation of the activity. The participant with whom you are paired 
will receive the sheet that you completed, indicating how much money he or 
she received from you, out of the €10.
 7) The experimenter will then anonymously pay the other participants [who are 
paired with someone in this room] their total earnings, and will then pay you 
anonymously. This will conclude the experiment.
Are there questions? Once we answer any questions we will proceed to open the 
envelopes. [please open only one of the two envelopes.]
Decision sheet
Number of the person with whom you are paired: ________
Your number (please write your number in the space on the right): ________
Amount of money to give to the other person: €____.___
(in €0.10 increments)
Amount of money to keep for yourself: €____.___
(in €0.10 increments)
 (These two quantities must sum to €10.00)
Decision sheet
You have opted to not participate in the activity. You will not be paired with another 
participant. At the end of the session, you will receive €10 plus the €5 for participation.
Your number (please write your number in the space on the right): ________
Instructions for participants with even numbers
During the next few minutes, please complete the questionnaire on the attached 
sheet. After finishing, please wait a few minutes quietly for me to return. At that 
time, I will pay you the €5. In addition, it is possible that I will require the participa-
tion of some of you for a brief additional activity in the session.
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While you wait, you may complete the payment receipt. Please leave the amount 
blank.
Final information for participants with even numbers
While you were out of this room, [some of ] the participants here participated in 
an activity in which they distributed €10 between themselves and one of you. You 
are paired with one of these participants. This other participant decided how much 
money, from €0.00 to €10.00, to give to you and how much to keep for him- or her-
self. In a moment you will see a sheet on which this participant has indicated how 
much money to give to you. This amount, along with the €5 for participation, will 
be your payment for this session.
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